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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN
ACT OF 1966 AND THE SURETY'S PRIORITY TO
RETAINAGES
THE Federal Tax Lien Act of 19661 amended the Miller Act2 to
require that obligatory performance bonds on government construc-
tion contracts include coverage for contractor default in withholding
tax payments. Treasury Department figures, urged in support of
enactment, indicated that the construction industry, which accounts
for only a small portion of withholding tax revenue, was responsible
for twenty-six percent of the defaults in payment of tax actually
withheld.3 According to government testimony before the House
Ways and Means Committee, collection of these taxes had been
greatly frustrated by judicial holdings that taxes are not wages or
materials, and thus not covered by Miller Act bonds.4 The Gov-
ernment alleged that these decisions had stimulated "net payroll
financing," whereby the surety pays only "after tax" wages, through
the insolvent contractor, to the unpaid workmen, which further re-
duces tax revenues.5 Collection could not be made from the laborers,
as they had already "paid"; nor from the surety, as the taxes were
not covered by the bond; and the contractor remained insolvent.
Though the surety industry protested that the practice was not
common,6 Congress responded to the Government's requests and,
essentially, shifted the collection problem to the surety.7  Sur-
prisingly, the surety industry did not strenuously object, 8 but did
insist upon a reasonable notice requirement and a limit to the time
within which suit could be instituted on the bond.9 These sug-
1 Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, § 105(b), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (d) (Supp. II, 1965.66).
240 U.S.C. §§ 270a-d (1964).
3 Hearings on HS. 11256 and HR. 11290 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 42-44 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
1Id. at 39; see, e.g., Nickell v. United States ex rel. Texas Vitrified Pipe Co., 340
F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Maryland Gas. Co., 323 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1963); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.
1952).
5Hearings 39. See also Gallagher, The Good and the Bad for Surety Companies
Under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 34 INs. COUNSEL J. 214, 218 (1967).
'Hearings 226.
7See Gallagher, supra note 5.
8 Hearings 221.
OId. at 221-23.
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gestions were incorporated into the statute, which provides that no
suit may be brought on the bond unless notice of taxes remaining
unpaid is given the surety within ninety days after the contractor
files a return, or within one hundred and eighty days from the
required filing date if a timely return has not been filed. In all
cases, suit on the bond must be commenced within one year from
the date of filing the required notice.' 0
Controversy between the United States and a Miller Act surety
has often involved the question of whether a surety has a right to
retainages, withheld by the United States under the terms of a
construction contract, free from setoff of government claims against
the contractor. In Prairie State Bank v. United States". and Hen-
ningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,12 the Su-
preme Court established that a surety to a federal contract who is
called upon to pay on his bond has an equitable right to indemnifica-
tion out of the retainages, by subrogation to the Government's
position. The Court observed in Prairie State, a performance bond
case, that payment made to the Government under compulsion of
the contract of suretyship subrogates the surety to all the rights and
remedies which the Government is capable of asserting against its
debtor-contractor, including indemnification out of retainages. 3
Without detailing its analysis, the Court, in Henningsen, applied
equitable subrogation to reach the same result in a payment bond
case. Later cases applying Henningsen have interpreted the Court's
rationale to be that, since there is no legal relationship between the
United States and the laborers and materialmen, the payment bond
surety becomes subrogated to the laborers' and materialmen's equi-
table right to be compensated, and the corresponding equitable
obligation of the Government to ensure payment.1 The statu-
tory requirement of a payment bond on government contracts
has been viewed as congressional recognition of these equitable
rights and duties. 15 Both Prairie State and Henningsen involved
the United States as stakeholder in a controversy between the
10 Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, §105 (b), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (d) (Supp. If, 1965-66).
"- 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
12 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
13 164 U.S. at 231-33.
1 See, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 383-84 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
25 Cf. Western Gas. & Sur. Co. v. Brooks, 362 F.2d 486, 491 n.23 (4th Cir. 1966).
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surety and other claimants to the retainages. The surety's subroga-
tive rights, arising with the contract of suretyship, were said to take
precedence over later claims of general creditors and assignees of
the contractor.' 6 A subsequent case, United States v. Munsey Trust
Company,17 pitted the Government against a surety asserting the
priority of his claim. The Supreme Court, ignoring its earlier reli-
ance on equitable subrogation, held that there was no legal relation-
ship between the laborers and the United States to which the surety
could become subrogated. The surety, as subrogated to the posi-
tion of the contractor, was, in the Court's view, a creditor against
whom the United States could offset claims of its own, an exercise
of the well established right of a debtor to offset his own claim against
that of his creditor.'8 Some fifteen years later, in Pearlman v. Reli-
ance Insurance Company,19 the Court held that Munsey had not
disturbed Prairie State and Henningsen, and that the surety does
have an equitable right to indemnification out of the retainages. 20
However, the Court did not indicate whether the surety's right was
superior to the right of the United States to offset its claims.
Some courts have allowed, and others denied, tax debt setoffs
against retainages without consideration of the subrogation ques-
tion. 21 The Court of Claims, though concluding that the surety has
an equity superior to claimants other than the Government,22 has,
since 1951, unwaveringly held that the United States may offset taxes
owed by the contractor against the retainages, reasoning that since
Munsey, the Supreme Court has not placed the equitable rights
of the surety in a superior position to the right of the United States
16 See National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 384 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
1332 U.S. 234 (1947).
8 Id. at 241-44.
371 U.S. 132 (1962).
20 Id. at 140-41.
21See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 231 F.2d 573, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Zschach Constr. Co., 209 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1954); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v.
American Employer's Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D.N.D. 1961). But see United
States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 201 F. Supp. 630, 634-36 (N.D. Tex. 1961); United States
ex rel. Gregg v. Seaboard Eng'r Co., 125 F. Supp. 918, 919 (E.D. Va. 1954).
22 Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 462, 464 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 833 (1967); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 383-84 (Ct.
C1.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
[Vol. 1968,406
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to offset contractor-owed debts against retained funds.23  A few
courts have found, in the manner of Prairie State and Henningsen,
that the surety becomes subrogated to the rights of the Government
upon discharge of the contractor's obligations under the construc-
tion contract. They reason further that the surety's rights relate back
to the bonded contract, arise prior to the tax lien, and thus are
superior to it.24 A recent case, Trinity Universal Insurance Com-
pany v. United States,25 adopts still another rationale.
Trinity Universal Insurance executed the bonds required under
the Miller Act for Dallas Building, Inc., which had been awarded a
million dollar contract for construction of a nuclear warfare labora-
tory. When the contract was substantially completed and most of
the progress payments had been made, Dallas Building defaulted. At
that time, $39,906.96 in retainages and $67,276.16 in funds appropri-
ated for the completion of the contract remained unpaid. Trinity
Universal elected to complete the contract, expending $116,623.37
in so doing. The remaining appropriated funds were paid to Trin-
ity Universal. Against the retainages, however, the Government
asserted a $6495.07 setoff for payroll taxes owed by Dallas Building,
and that amount was deducted from the retainages paid to Trinity.
In a suit brought to recover these funds, the district court denied
recovery, concluding on the basis of Munsey that the Government
had the right to setoff its tax claims against contract retainages.26
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, unconvinced
that the Government should have a right to retainages superior
to the rights of the surety. While Munsey established that the
Government could offset its tax claims against retainages where
the Government has been forced to recontract, at additional ex-
pense, for completion of the project, the Fifth Circuit also found in
Munsey a recognition that a surety completing construction might
be entitled to retainages, as well as to progress payments. Pearlman
28 See Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 462 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 833 (1967) (surety paid damages due under bond); Barrett v. United States, 367
F.2d 834, 838 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (surety paid laborers and materialmen on completed con-
tract); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 829 (Ct. Cl. 1951) (sure-
ty completed contract).
2-See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 121
(10th Cir. 1952); Glenn v. American Sur. Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1947); New
York Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
2r 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1967).
26 Id. at 319.
Vol. 1968: 406]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
lent support to this distinction, the Fifth Circuit observed, since
it explicitly stated that Munsey had not quashed the completing
surety's right to indemnification established by Prairie State. The
surety who completed the contract was not only a creditor of the
Government, by subrogation to the rights of the contractor, but was
also, by virtue of performance of his suretyship guarantees, sub-
rogated to the rights and remedies of the Government against the
contractor, including indemnification from retainages, and enjoyed
a position superior to the tax lien.-" The court felt that to hold
otherwise would be to require the surety to work for less than the
contract price. The court further noted that "[i]f the government
undertook to complete the contract, the surety would be liable for
costs exceeding the contract price, but not for taxes owed by the
contractor. '28  Since the surety relieves the Government of a sub-
stantial burden by completing the project, an equity court should
not penalize him for doing so, the Fifth Circuit concluded.
The amendment to the Miller Act, as a practical matter, adopts
the result obtained in the Court of Claims. The requirement of
specific coverage for withholding tax default will permit the Govern-
ment to recover contractor tax deficiencies from the surety, without
consideration of the subrogation problems which arise absent the
statute. However, should the Government fail to observe the notice
requirement or limitation period, no suit may be commenced on
the bond. In such event, it seems likely that the Government will
attempt to offset its claim against retainages on the priority rationale
advanced by the Court of Claims, thus resurrecting problems exist-
ing prior to the recent Miller Act amendment. This prospect is
clearly indicated by a memorandum from the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, included
in the transcript of the Hearings on the Tax Lien Act, wherein
the Commissioner stated that "nothing in this bill is intended to
reverse United States v. Munsey Trust Co."'2  While the amended
Act deliberately bypasses the issue of priority raised in Munsey
and Pearlman, and offers no attempt to reconcile them, the enact-
ment of the amendment may well aid the Government in setoff
litigation.
27 Id. at 320.211 d. at 321.
29 Hearings 48.
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The variegated decisions prior to the Miller Act amendment
seem to have been engendered by a conflict between the equitable
principles of subrogation and the equitable doctrine allowing offset
of debtors' claims against creditors. Viewed in these terms, the
question is clearly one of priorities; i.e., whether the tax lien, an
equitable offset, takes priority over equitable subrogative rights.
Logic would seem to dictate that the latter should prevail, as the
offset is one of the Government's rights against the contractor to
which the surety should become subrogated, thus extinguishing that
right in the Government.30 A different determination therefore
should result only from a policy decision that the tax lien must
prevail. Factors integral to a resolution of the problem might in-
clude the Government's need for revenue, the construction industry's
bad record of tax default, the role of the surety as guarantor of com-
plete performance, and the economic effect of the decision on the
surety industry and on Government contract costs. Consideration of
these factors is arguably rendered nugatory, however, if one views
the enactment of the tax guaranty requirement as indicative of a
congressional preference for superiority of the Government's in-
terest. And while it may be argued that Congress provided the
Government with an exclusive remedy in the amended Miller Act,
the Treasury draftsmen of the legislation seem to have intended
otherwise. When coupled with the statute's failure to expressly fore-
close the possibility of setoff, these factors portend a more certain
surety liability for contractor tax defaults.
8o See Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 232 (1896).
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